Volltextsuche nutzen
- versandkostenfrei ab € 30,–
- 11x in Wien, NÖ und Salzburg
- 6 Mio. Bücher
- facultas
- Detailansicht
Cost, Uncertainty and Welfare
Frank Knight's Theory of Imperfect Competition
E-Book
(PDF mit drm)
(PDF mit drm)
35,72€
inkl. gesetzl. MwSt.
EPDF (mit DRM) sofort downloaden
Downloads sind nur in Österreich möglich!
Leitfaden zu E-Books
Downloads sind nur in Österreich möglich!
Leitfaden zu E-Books
In den Warenkorb
Click & Collect
Artikel online bestellen und in der Filiale abholen.
Derzeit in keiner facultas Filiale lagernd. Jetzt online bestellen!Artikel online bestellen und in der Filiale abholen.
Artikel in den Warenkorb legen, zur Kassa gehen und Wunschfiliale auswählen. Lieferung abholen und bequem vor Ort bezahlen.
Auf die Merkliste
Veröffentlicht 2018, von Stephan John Nash bei Taylor and Francis
ISBN: 978-0-429-87319-5
Reihe: Routledge Revivals
205 Seiten
First published in 1998. This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in ...
Beschreibung
First published in 1998. This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in the market. The author demonstrates that while Knight provides the intellectual stimulus which propelled Chamberlin's thesis of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin uses a very abstract form of uncertainty in his analysis.
First published in 1998. This work contributes to the discussion of Knight by showing that uncertainty broadens the conception of economic welfare, and that a new cost analysis holds the key to unlocking the Knightian corpus. It develops Knight's suggestion that uncertainty-control costs can be reduced - arguing that the large firm enjoys economic rent from utilizing its dominant vantage point in the market. The author demonstrates that while Knight provides the intellectual stimulus which propelled Chamberlin's thesis of monopolistic competition, Chamberlin uses a very abstract form of uncertainty in his analysis.